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. Introduction
The Warren Court left for us an irresistible case study in legal change,
particularly for the criminal justice field. Over the years, many people have
evaluated the direction of change that the Warren Court wrought in criminal
justice. They have asked whether the Warren Court was truly prodefense or
whether it carried an exaggerated reputation on this score. Previous accounts
of the Warren Court also estimated the amount of change that the Court
imposed on police, prosecutors, defense lawyers, and trial judges. These
* Professor of Law, Wake Forest University. This Article formed the basis of a
presentation at the Washington and Lee University School of Law Symposium, "The
Jurisprudential Legacy of the Warren Court," on March 22, 2002. My thanks go to Ronald J.
Krotoszynski, Jr., and the organizers of the symposium. I also appreciate the comments that I
received from Darryl Brown, Robert Chesney, Anne Coughlin, Michael Curtis, David Logan,
Marc Miller, Wilson Parker, and Richard Schneider.
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writers debated whether the Warren Court's landmark decisions were consis-
tent with existing case law and whether the Court displayed a judicious
willingness to compromise.'
I plan to use this same starting point - the amount of change the Warren
Court created - but then strike out along a different path. So I begin with this
unsurprising proposition: the Warren Court introduced more changes into the
criminal justice system than did its predecessors. The Warren Court earned
this reputation in its own time, and the image stuck.'
This Article then takes an institutional turn by examining the makers of
criminal justice rather than the end product. Who carried out the changes that
the Warren Court began? How have other legal institutions, particularly state
appellate courts and legislatures, responded to the environment of massive
change that the Supreme Court created? The questions look past the merits
of any particular case that created flux. Instead, I ask more generally about
an atmosphere in which major change became the norm.
In the generations that followed the Warren Court era, state institutions
embraced change.3 The Supreme Court's habit of constantly tinkering with
the machinery of criminal justice spread to the state level. State courts and
legislative bodies may not always like the changes, but they now anticipate
and create change rather than react to it. This result is one of the major
institutional legacies of the Warren Court in the criminal justice field. Thus,
the Warren Court was fire: turning a solid situation into a fluid one, creating
movement, and causing chemical reactions.4 Since 1969, other institutions
have changed their habits to deal with this more fluid world of criminal
justice.5
The presence of these lively institutions at the state level is an ironic
legacy for the Warren Court. The Warren Court is known as an enemy of
federalism, and that reputation had some basis in the short run. In the criminal
justice area, the thrust of the Court's landmark cases was to centralize, to push
state systems toward a more uniform criminal process, a push that tracked the
federal system. The Warren Court unified criminal justice by restricting the
discretion of police officers operating in the field and of trial judges.6 But the
1. See infra notes 28-38 and accompanying text (discussing Warren Court's willingness
to break with precedent).
2. See infra notes 15-27 and accompanying text (discussing critiques of Warren Court).
3. See infra Part HI (discussing impact of Warren Court decisions on state courts and
state legislatures).
4. See infra Part I (discussing changes that Warren Court decisions brought).
5. See infra Part M (discussing impact of Warren Court decisions on state courts, federal
courts, and state legislatures).
6. See infra notes 15-19, 39-60 and accompanying text (discussing restraints on and
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long term effects of the Warren Court's criminal justice decisions left an
unexpectedly vibrant federal system. State actors at the higher levels of state
government, particularly in the appellate courts and legislative bodies adapted
quickly. They turned into reality many parts of the Warren Court's vision that
the Court itself only defined in the abstract. What began as movement toward
uniformity ended with a profusion of independent actors that continually
anticipated and initiated change for themselves.'
The Rehnquist Court, on the other hand, is ice. State courts and legisla-
tures now routinely interpret the federal constitution and anticipate ways that
it might shift over time." They also have discovered their authority to interpret
state constitutions to place their own brand of restrictions on government
actors.9 Legislative bodies have learned to amend codes in ways that make the
federal constitution irrelevant." In response to these innovations in state
courts and legislatures, the Rehnquist Court's most famous and emblematic
decisions have the effect of ice: slowing down and freezing into place what
once ran more freely."
Thus, the Rehnquist Court also finds itself in an ironic position when it
comes to federalism in criminal justice. Although the Justices often speak
warmly of the benefits of variety in state criminal justice systems, their
decisions sometimes snuff out variety in the states."2 This icy effect does not
flow from every Rehnquist Court opinion on criminal justice. Sometimes
state courts continue to pursue a variety of approaches to a question, even
after the Supreme Court has spoken and thrown its support behind one ap-
proach. 3 I close this Article with a few observations about this puzzle: What
features of the cases explain why some Rehnquist Court opinions, and not
others, function like ice among the state courts? 4
changes to state criminal justice systems that Warren Court decisions brought).
7. See infra Part M (discussing impact of Warren Court decisions on state courts and
state legislatures).
8. See infra Part M (discussing impact of Warren Court decisions on state courts and
state legislatures).
9. See infra Part IIA (discussing impact of Warren Court decisions on state court
decisions).
10. See infra Part m.C (discussing impact of Warren Court decisions on state legisla-
tures).
11. See infra Part IV (discussing chilling effect of Rehnquist Court decisions on state
courts and legislatures).
12. See infra notes 99-120 and accompanying text (discussing Rehnquist Court criminal
justice decisions and federalism).
13. See infra notes 121-33 and accompanying text (discussing Moran v. Burbine, 475
U.S. 412 (1986), and state court reactions to this decision).
14. See infra notes 134-35 and accompanying text (discussing possible reasons that
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II Warren Court Fire Creates a Fluid World
The story begins with a claim that should not astonish anyone: The
rulings of the Warren Court in criminal justice were dramatic and unsettling.
They forced immediate changes in practice, some of them expensive and
difficult to achieve. The Court's opinions also strongly hinted that even larger
changes in practice would occur in the near future. The cumulative effect of
these cases altered the entire environment for state actors in the criminal
process. They faced a fluid world in which every aspect of criminal justice
was up for debate.
This judgment about the Warren Court gained broad endorsement from
the start. Critics of the Court pointed out the disruption that the rulings caused
and singled out the criminal procedure cases for special criticism. 5 Law
enforcement officials and judges complained that the Warren Court, more than
any other Supreme Court in memory, upset their routines and made it too
difficult for them to investigate and prosecute crimes. 6 These complaints
spoke both to the prodefense direction of change and to the amount of change
that the Court was forcing on the states. " The new decisions "handcuffed the
cops." ' In the famous campaign rhetoric of Richard Nixon, the Warren Court
placed too many limits on the "peace forces" and not enough on the "criminal
forces.'
19
Some legal academics gave essentially the same judgment. Although
academic critics of the Court placed more weight on the amount of change and
complained less directly about the prodefense tilt of the Court, both elements
explain why state courts may not adopt Supreme Court decisions).
15. See Alexander Holtzoff, Shortcomings in the Administration of Criminal Law, 17
HASTINGS L.J. 17, 28-37 (1965) (criticizing Court's tendencies to repeatedly reexamine guilty
verdicts and. to overturn convictions on technicalities); Fred E. Inbau, Democratic Restraints
Upon the Police, 57 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOLOGY & POLCE Sci. 265, 266-67 (1966) (noting that
Court's attempt to "police the police" is misguided and better left to legislatures).
16, See, e.g., O.W. Wilson, Crime, the Courts, and the Police, 57 . CRIM. L. CRIMINOL-
OGY & POUCE SM. 291,293-96 (1966) (arguing that Court's emphasis on rights of individuals
frustrates main functions of effective police work).
17. See Inbau, supra note 15, at 267 (describing effect of Court's rulings on states).
18. More Criminals to Go Free? Effect of High Court's Ruling, U.S. NEWS & WORLD
REP., June 27, 1966, at 32 (stating reaction of Los Angeles Mayor Samuel Yorty to Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1967)); see also Paul 0. Cassell & Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the
Cops? A Thirty-Year Perspective on Miranda's Harmful Effects on Law Enforcement, 50 STAN.
L. REV. 1055, 1055 (1998) (arguing thatMiranda has led to lower crime clearance rates and less
effective police questioning).
19. See Arlen J Large, "Law and Order" - Into the Fuzzy Swirl, WALL ST. J., Oct. 22,
1968, at 20 (examining law and order focus of 1968 presidential election); see also DONALD
GRIER STEPHENSON, JR., CAMPAIGNS ANDTHECOURT: THE U.S. SUPREME COURTINPRESIDEN-
TIAL Ei.ECTIONS 179-82 (1999) (chronicling Richard Nixon's rhetoric against judicial activism).
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of the popular critique were present. According to Philip Kurland, from the
University of Chicago, the Warren Court started out as reasonable.2" But
beginning with its decision inMapp v. Ohio,2" the Court produced "wholesale
revisions" of state criminal procedure.' After Mapp, the Court demonstrated
each year that its "intoxication with its own power was not diminished."23 The
future looked grim for the institution: "Like Caesar, the Court was ambitious.
Like Caesar, its ambitions have been only partially requited. Unlike Caesar,
the Court has not yet been assassinated. But there are some senators with a
lean and hungry look.
24
Many in the legal academy offered more sympathetic evaluations of the
Warren Court's work on the whole, but even the Court's friends conceded at
the time that the criminal justice cases constituted a "revolution."25 Archibald
Cox, the Solicitor General during the Johnson and Kennedy administrations,
believed that the Court's rulings reformed criminal justice "in the States where
reform was most needed, within an unusually short span of time."'26 But he
also conceded that the reforms came with serious institutional costs: they
caused a "radical revision of the structure of government" and undermined "the
ideal of law as something distinct from the arbitrary preferences of individu-
als."
27
The Warren Court's willingness to break with precedent reflected its
ambition in criminal justice cases. Jerold Israel, Yale Kamisar, Stephen
20. PHILIP B. KURLAND, PoLutics, TE CONSTITUTION, AND THE WARREN COURT 75
(1970) (noting that decisions before 1961 generally reviewed criminal procedures in established
ways).
21. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
22. KURLAND, supra note 20, at 75.
23. Id. at 78.
24. Id.; see also Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren
Court and the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 539 (discussing Court's retreat from
precedent and its arrogant lack of articulation for bases of its decisions); Henry J. Friendly, The
Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CAL. L. REV. 929, 930 (1965) (warning
against Court moving too fast to determine detailed rules of criminal procedure).
25. See CRAIGM. BRADLEY, THE FAILURE OFTHECRIMINALPRocEDURE REVOLUION 29-
34 (1993) (characterizing Warren Court dicta as revolutionary).
26. ARCHIBALD Cox, THE WARREN COURT: CONSITUTIONAL DECISION AS ANINSTRU-
MENT OF REFoRM 88-89 (1968).
27. Id. at 89; see also ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF
PROGRESS 54-58 (2d ed. 1978) (discussing major impact of applying some Warren Court
decisions retroactively); JESSE CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POUTICAL
PROCESS 270 (1980) (discussing increased ambition in scope of Court's exercise of judicial
review); LEONARD W. LEVY,AGAINST THE LAW: THE NIXON COURTAND CRIMINALJUSTICE 25-
36 (1974) (examining judicial review and constitutional interpretation process and concluding
that it is "overwhelmingly a means of rationalizing preferred ends").
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Saltzburg, and others have debated this subject thoroughly. They looked back
on the Warren Court more than a decade after it ended and argued that the
most famous criminal justice decisions of the era were only modest extensions
of prior case law.2" However, while the Warren Court's use of prior case law
did appear routine and reasonable when compared to the work of the Burger
Court, hindsight can obscure our view of the Warren Court's treatment of
precedent. Those who discussed the use of precedent at the time noticed a
major difference between the Warren Court and its predecessor, the Vinson
Court. Francis Allen put it this way: "[S]tates are now confronted by a cata-
logue of constitutional restraints hardly contemplated as recently as a genera-
tion ago."
29
This description fits most of the important Warren Court criminal justice
cases, even such modest innovations as Aguilar v. Texas.3° In Aguilar, the
Court created a more specific standard for courts to use in evaluating whether
evidence from an informant amounted to probable cause. Under the new
standard, an affidavit supporting a search warrant based on hearsay evidence
needed to demonstrate both the basis of the informant's knowledge and the
informant's veracity and reliability." This new standard did not contradict or
abandon the old one, but it did shift authority over these questions away from
the magistrate and into the appellate courts.3 2 The two-pronged structure of
28. See Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure, the Burger Court, and the Legacy of the
Warren Court, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1320, 1383-84 (1977) (stating that Miranda warning require-
ment did not impose major administrative burden on police); Yale Kamisar, The Warren Court
(Was ItReallySoDefense-Minded?), The Burger Court (Is ItReallySo Prosecution-Oriented?),
and Police InvestigatoryPractices, in TBE BURGER COURT: THE COuNTER-REVOLUTION THAT
WASN'T 62, 63-68 (V. Blasi ed., 1983) ("[More often than not[, the Warren Court's] criminal
procedure decisions reflected a pattern of moderation and compromise."); Stephen Saltzburg,
Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of Constitutional Criminal Procedure in the Warren and Burger
Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 152-58 (1980) (arguing that Warren Court decisions generally were
congruent with established doctrines).
29. Francis A. Allen, The Supreme Court, Federalism, and State Systems of Criminal
Justice, 8 DEPAUL L. REV. 213, 215-16 (1959); see also COX, supra note 26, at 87-88 ("If one
may measure 'activism' by the overruling of settled precedents and the establishment of new
constitutional doctrines, the Warren Court has been extraordinarily 'activist' in the field of
criminal procedure."); Jerold Israel, Gideon v. Wainwright- The "Art" of Overruling, 1963 SuP.
CT. REV. 211, 211-15 (discussing vast changes that Warren Court decisions had on state
criminal procedure).
30. 378 U.S. 108 (1964); see also Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410,417-19 (1969)
(elaborating Aguilar standards), overruled by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
31. See Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 114 (1964) (identifying requirements of affidavit
and search warrant), overruled by Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).
32. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT § 3.3(a) (3d ed. 1996) (criticizing rationales of Gates).
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the new rule profoundly changed a test that, until then, had remained conspic-
uously unstructured.)
Other prominent cases showed even more clearly that the Warren Court
placed less value on precedent than did its predecessors. Without any serious
showing of changed circumstances, Mapp v. Ohio overruled a case that was
less than fifteen years old.34 Miranda v. Arizona" addressed the perennial
problem of coerced confessions but relied in an unprecedented way on the Fifth
Amendment for the solution rather than on the voluntariness standard under the
Due Process Clause.36 And the announcement in United States v. Wade3l that
attorneys had to attend identification procedures such as lineups in the police
station" was truly a bolt from the blue. The Court had no substantial body of
cases on this problem before Wade, and the Court's solution opened an entire
new field for defense attorneys.
Another potential measure of change looks to the number of states
obliged to change their criminal justice practices because of a Supreme Court
opinion. Some of the Warren Court's most celebrated cases, such as Gideon
v. Wainwright,39 impacted a surprisingly small number of states. Gideon
required the states to provide counsel in all serious criminal cases.4" The law
of about thirty-five states already embodied this requirement, and local
33. See Howard Abrahams, Spinelli v. United States: Search for Probable Cause, 30 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 735, 742 (1969) (explaining how Aguilar required that affidavit from police to
magistrate to secure search warrant based on informants must set forth "underlying circum-
stances" necessary for magistrate to determine validity of informants' claims and support that
informant was "credible"); Henry S. Mather, The Informer's Tip as Probable Cause for Search
or Arrest, 54 CORNEU. L. REv. 958, 968 (1969) (noting that Aguilar requires two-pronged test
for "reasonableness" evaluation). The Burger Court later moved back to a less structured
method for weighing probable cause in this setting. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238-39
(1983) (returning to "totality of the circumstances" test). A number of state courts maintained
the former more highly structured approach under their state constitutions. See State v.
Cordova, 784 P.2d 30, 33 (N.M. 1989) (noting that New Mexico rules independently govern
probable cause determination).
34. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961), overruling Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25
(1949). See Francis A. Allen, Federalism and the Fourth Amendment: A Requiem for Wolf,
1961 SUP. CT. REV. ,1, 1,40 (noting that "the interest ofMapp... [cannot] be explained by any
particular difficulty or subtlety in the immediate issues involved" and that Mapp's exclusionary
rule is based on "unsatisfactory" theories of police misconduct).
35. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
36. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436,436 (1966).
37. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
38. United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218,223-24 (1967).
39. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
40. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
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practice in most of the other states was consistent with the requirement even
when the law did not address it.4
However, other Warren Court cases mandated major changes in a large
number of cases. Mapp v. Ohio introduced into a majority of states the
exclusionary rule remedy for illegal searches and seizures.42 In Boykin v.
Alabama,43 the Court addressed the high volume, and therefore high stakes,
world of guilty pleas.44 It announced that many features of the federal rules
governing the information that judges provided to defendants during a guilty
plea hearing were thereafter constitutional requirements.45 This announce-
ment shifted practices in a large number of states.46
The full amount of change that the Warren Court created encompasses
more than the reforms that it required immediately. People celebrated and
vilified many of the Court's opinions not just for what they held but for what
they hinted. They hinted at an unsettling absolutist quality. The Court's
opinions foreshadowed a world in which the states would carry out their
egalitarian ideals without compromise. Philip Kurland complained that for
the Warren Court "every proposition had to be taken to its logical extreme."47
Examples of this absolutist flavor in the Court's rhetoric are plentiful.48
41. See Israel, supra note 28, at 1338 n.76 (acknowledging dispute over Gideon's actual
impact on changing practice in most states); Yale Kamisar, The Right to Counsel and the
Fourteenth Amendment: A Dialogue on 'The MostPervasive Right" ofan Accused, 30 U. CII.
L. REv. 1, 17-20, 67-74 (1962) (presenting study on number of states already providing Gideon
protections). These accounts may understate the impact of Gideon because they do not
distinguish between states that provided counsel on request and those that provided counsel as
a matter of course.
42. See Allen, supra note 34, at 20 (noting sweeping effect of Mapp); Roger J. Traynor,
Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty States, 1962 DuKE L.J. 319, 319 (noting that Mapp extended
exclusionary rule to all states).
43. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
44. Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238,242 (1969).
45. Id. at 243.
46. See KURLAND, supra note 20, at 81 (discussing how Warren Court imposed uniform
practices for judges when deciding whether to accept guilty pleas).
47. Id. atxx. Butsee MnLvINI. UROFSKY, THEWARRENCOURT: JUSTICEs,RULINGS,AND
LEGACY 236, 241 (2001) (arguing that Warren Court, despite some allegedly radical decisions,
did not attempt to alter criminal justice).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1967) (establishing right to
counsel at post-charge lineups); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965) (noting rule
against prosecutorial comment on defendant's refusal to testify at trial). The Griffin Court
explained that: "[C]omment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the 'inquisitorial system
of criminal justice,' which the Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is a penalty imposed by courts for
exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down on the privilege by making its assertion
costly." Id. at 614. The Wade Court explained its ruling as follows:
1436
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The Court in Griffin v. Illinois49 made an extraordinary and appealing observa-
tion about poverty and criminal justice: "In criminal trials a State can no more
discriminate on account of poverty than on account of religion, race, or
color .... [The] ability to pay costs in advance bears no relationship to
defendant's guilt or innocence."5 Although the decision reached a narrow
holding - states must provide trial transcripts to indigent defendants on
appeal5 - the implications of the Court's language were tremendous. Simi-
larly, the language of Gideon v. Wainwright appealed to some powerful ideals
about the value of defense counsel:
This seems to us to be an obvious truth. Governments, both state and
federal, quite properly spend vast sums of money to establish machinery
to try defendants accused of crime. Lawyers to prosecute are everywhere
deemed essential to protect the public's interest in an orderly society.
Similarly, there are few defendants charged with crime, few indeed, who
fail to hire the best lawyers they can get to prepare and present their de-
fenses. That government hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who
have the money hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the
widespread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not
luxuries. The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trials in some countries, but it is
in ours.
5 2
Again, the language recognized no boundaries. Lawyers are "necessities, not
luxuries" for anyone "charged with a crime." 3
These examples are not intended to say that the Warren Court always
took the most extreme position available to it. Nor do they mean that the
Court entirely ignored the competing considerations at stake in these cases.54
The trial which might determine the accused's fate may well not be that in the
courtroom but that at the pretrial confrontation, with the State aligned against the
accused, the witness the sole jury, and the accused unprotected against the over-
reaching, intentional or unintentional, and with little or no effective appeal from the
judgment there rendered by the witness - "that's the man."
Wade, 388 U.S. at 235-36.
49. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
50. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 17-18 (1956); see also Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S.
40, 42 (1967) (granting indigent defendant entitlement to free preliminary hearing transcript
when useful for preparing for trial); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353,358 (1963) (mandat-
ing appointment of free counsel on first appeal as of right).
51. Griffin, 351 U.S. at 19.
52. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
53. Id.
54. See Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 637 (1965) (limiting retroactive effect of
Mapp).
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But the Court did explain its holdings by appealing to a set of high ideals,
particularly the ideals of racial equality and equal access to justice despite
economic differences among defendants.5" These ideals suggested that
criminal justice generally, and the state systems especially, had a long way to
go.
As others have observed, the Warren Court's criminal justice decisions
did not all run in the same direction. The Court did create some constitutional
doctrine favoring law enforcement.56 But the Warren Court cases that favored
law enforcement also made the environment more fluid. Even when the Court
ruled for the Government, its decisions were unsettling. For instance, Terry
v. Ohio 7 introduced a completely new tier into Fourth Amendment analysis by
allowing stops and frisks based on "reasonable suspicion," a level of evidence
more than a mere "hunch" but less than traditional probable cause."8 The Court
spoke in Terry about the need to select search and seizure requirements only
after balancing individual and government interests.59 This new methodology
created real uncertainty about when the new system of "reasonable suspicion"
requirements might apply.60
In sum, the Warren Court cases created an atmosphere more favorable to
legal control over criminal justice. The decisions accustomed law enforcement
,agencies to the need for change. The idea that the Constitution might force a
shift in police practices or courtroom customs became familiar. And the
experience with many Warren Court holdings demonstrated for many that
change was manageable, because even the most unpopular decisions were not
truly disruptive. But the Supreme Court was not the only agent of change in
this new environment.
55. See Yale Kamisar, Has the Court Left the Attorney General Behind? - The Bazelon-
Katzenbach Letters on Poverty, Equality, and the Administration of Criminal Justice, 54 KY.
LI. 464, 469 (1966) (suggesting that Warren Court emphasized equal protection, fairness, and
equality at cost of police efficiency); A. Kenneth Pye, The Warren Court and Criminal Proce-
dure, 67 MICH. L. REv. 249, 256-60 (1968) (stating that Warren Court sought to equalize
criminal process across racial and economic continuum).
56. See Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,770-72 (1966) (authorizing blood samples
without warrant); Allen, supra note 24, at 537-38 (noting decline in judicial activism at close
of Warren Court); Israel, supra note 28, at 1347 (discussing argument that later Warren Court
decisions shifted back toward mainstream consensus on proper police power).
57. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
58. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,27(1968).
59. Id. at21-22.
60. See Ronald J. Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of
Probable Cause, 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 763, 765 (outlining how reasonableness standard changes
with circumstances in each case); Ronald F. Wright, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of
the Fourth Amendment, 93 YAlE L.J. 1127, 1127 (1984) (criticizing balancing method to
determine permissibility of searches).
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II. Habits of Change Spread to the States
As time passed and Earl Warren and his colleagues gave way to Warren
Burger and three other appointees of President Nixon, many predicted that the
Burger Court would roll back the prodefense rulings of the Warren Court.6-
But the Burger Court did not overrule many of its predecessor's rulings out-
right. Instead, the Burger Court departed from the trajectory of the Warren
Court in two less obvious ways. First, the Burger Court reaffirmed many of
the ideals expressed in earlier opinions, even while it refused to extend them
to new settings. For instance, the Court in Ross v. Moffitt62 refused to require
the states to pay for defense counsel at every level of appeal but still endorsed
the importance of attorneys during the first level of appeal to prepare claims
for all appellate reviews.63
The Burger Court's second technique for changing the trajectory of the
Warren Court cases was procedural. A major component of the Warren
Court's agenda was to expand federal habeas corpus as a forum to enforce the
new constitutional rules that the Court applied to the states.' Similarly, the
61. See LEVY, supra note 27, at 60 (noting changing criminal justice jurisprudence under
President Nixon's Court); Otis H. Stephens, Jr., The Burger Court: New Dimensions in
Criminal Justice, 60 OEO. L.J. 249,250-66 (1971) (examining changes in criminal procedures
from Warren Court to Burger Court), Donald E. Wilkes, Jr., The New Federalism in Criminal
Procedure: State Court Evasion of the Burger Court, 62 KY. L.J. 421,423-24 (1974) (stating
that Burger Court wanted to restrict defendants' rights and repeal Warren Court chages).
62. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
63. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 616 (1974). In some areas, particularly those involving
search and seizure and identification procedures, the Burger and Rehnquist Courts did cut back
more clearly on the substance of the Warren Court holdings. Even there, scholars say that the
holdings contradict the "spirit" but not the "letter" of the earlier cases. See Craig M. Bradley
& Joseph L. Hoffmann, "Be Careful What You Ask For": The 2000 Presidential Election, the
U.S. Supreme Court, and the Law of Criminal Procedure, 76 IND. L.J. 889, 893 (2001) (noting
that Court has not overruled most Warren Court decisions but has recently advocated police
interests over defendants' interests); Carol S. Steiker, Counter-Revolution in Constitutional
Criminal Procedure? Two Audiences, Two Answers, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2466,2491-93 (1996)
(arguing that Court restricted availability of remedies without directly overruling Warren Court
decisions).
In other cases, the Burger Court expanded constitutional rights further than did the
Warren Court. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25,37 (1972) (requiring appointed counsel
at trial for any defendant that may receive incarceration as sentence). Once again, the broad
language of the Warren Court opinions makes it possible to argue that the Warren Court
eventually would have gone even further. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text
(discussing "absolutist flavor" of Warren Court decisions).
64. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S.
1 (1992); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504
U.S. 1 (1992); see Anthony 0. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in
Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 794-97 (1970) (discussing defendants' broadened
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Warren Court established more rigorous rules on "harmless error," a change
that made it difficult for appellate courts to keep a conviction intact even in the
face of legal error.65
The Burger Court changed the rules of habeas corpus to make it easier
for federal courts to avoid the merits of constitutional challenges. This change
was especially true for search and seizure claims, which federal courts could
no longer consider in habeas corpus petitions." But new habeas limitations
also applied to all other constitutional claims, as the Burger Court reinter-
preted the 1867 habeas statute.67 The Court also expanded other procedural
devices to allow federal courts to reduce the impact of the still vital constitu-
tional requirements.6
As Carol Steiker pointed out, this state of affairs was lousy for the
Court's public image. 69 The public noted the continued vitality of controver-
sial decisions like Miranda and others that set limits on police conduct. Only
more sophisticated readers of the Court's opinions realized that the federal
courts were, in fact, overturning fewer state convictions because of the new
procedural rules.70
But this continued endorsement of broad ideals, combined with narrowed
access to federal courts, also energized state courts and legislatures. The
Warren Court's vision of criminal justice remained largely intact, but the
access to habeas corpus hearings); Robert M. Cover & T. Alex Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federal-
ism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1041 (1977) (noting that Court used
habeas corpus as primary vehicle to enforce new constitutional criminal procedure rights).
65. See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 23 (1967) (holding that for federal constitu-
tional error to be considered harmless it must be harmless beyond reasonable doubt).
66. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,494 (1976).
67. Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 90-91 (1977); see generally Ronald F. Wright &
Marc Miller, In Your Court: State Judicial Federalism in Capital Cases, 18 URB. LAW. 659,
666 (1986) (stating that traditional use of habeas corpus was to challenge jurisdiction only but
that courts now use it to evaluate substantive issues).
68. For instance, the Court made it easier for the Government to establish that a suspect
consented to an otherwise illegal search. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218,248-49
(1973) (using totality of circumstances test to determine whether consent was voluntary). The
trend arguably began during the Warren Court itself. See Michael E. Tigar, The Supreme Court,
1969 Term - Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Disquiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 4-7 (1970) (lamenting that actual procedure in criminal justice system had not
improved for defendants despite Court's lofty constitutional decisions).
69. See Steiker, supra note 63, at 2549 (citing studies showing public's vast confidence
in law enforcement); cf. STEPHENSON, supra note 19, at 178 (noting that partial retroactivity of
Miranda created additional public hostility to opinion).
70. See Steiker, supra note 63, at 2532-33 (claiming that members of law enforcement
community have "more accurate and sophisticated understanding" of Court's rulings than does
general public).
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federal courts no longer developed and tended that vision. The state institu-
tions filled the vacuum. They adapted the Warren Court ideals to their own
purposes, both through state constitutional law and through their own distinc-
tive readings of the federal constitution.
A. Results Versus Habits in Reading State Constitutions
In the realm of state constitutional law, this era saw the beginning of the
"new judicial federalism." Justice William Brennan, perhaps out of impa-
tience with his new colleagues who failed to continue the criminal justice
reforms that the Warren Court began, encouraged state courts to take up the
cause for themselves. He pointed out that state courts could impose require-
ments on state law enforcement through interpretations of their own state
constitutions. These requirements might be more stringent than (or build on
the "floor" of) the federal constitution.7
State judges embraced the idea, at least in theory. Many well-regarded
judges wrote with enthusiasm about the possibilities for independent readings
of their state constitutions and started to identify circumstances in which such
interpretations were most likely or appropriate.72 In selected areas, the state
71. See William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual
Rights, 90 HARv. L. REv. 489, 498-502 (1977) (discussing how state courts have extended
rights beyond what Supreme Court has mandated); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights
and the States: The Revival of State Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61
N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 535 (1986) (noting that state courts have held their constitutions as more
protective of personal rights than federal protections). Earlier state courts had exercised this
same power, but Justice Brennan called for a renewed and expanded use of the power.
72. See Shirley S. Abrahamson, Criminal Law and State Constitutions: The Emergence
ofState ConstitutionalLaw, 63 TEX. L. REv. 1141,1143 (1985) (discussing trend of state courts
interpreting state constitutions to determine defendants' rights); Joseph R. Grodin, Some
Reflections on State Constitutions, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 391,399 (1988) (noting practice
of state courts finding that government actions violate state constitutions); Judith S. Kaye, Dual
Constitutionalism in Practice and Principle, 61 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 399,400 (1987) (question-
ing practice of state courts finding expanded protections under state constitutions); Hans A.
Linde, E Pluribus - Constitutional Theory and State Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 166 (1984)
(analyzing judicial review by state courts); Frank G. Mahady, Toward a Theory of State
Constitutional Jurisprudence: A Judge's Thoughts, 13 VT. L. REV. 145, 149 (1988) (stating
that state court analysis of state constitutions should take place through proper state authority);
Stanley Mosk, State Constitutionalism After Warren: Avoiding the Potomac's Ebb and Flow,
in DEvELoPMNENTs iN STATE CoNsTrUToNAL LAW 201,203 (Bradley D. McGraw ed., 1985)
(noting increased enforcement of state constitutions by state courts after Warren Court); Ellen
A. Peters, State Constitutional Law: Federalism in' the Common Law Tradition, 84 MICH. L.
REv. 583, 585-86 (1986) (analyzing resurgence of state court judicial review); Stewart 0.
Pollock, State Constitutions as Separate Sources of Fundamental Rights, 35 RUTGERS L. REV.
707, 716 (1983) (advancing belief that state constitutions provide separate sources of fundamen-
tal rights); Robert F. Utter, State Constitutional Law, the United States Supreme CourL and
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courts also took action. They strayed from the positions that the United States
Supreme Court announced and held that their state constitutions required
something different, that is, something more than the federal constitution.
For instance, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in Common-
wealth v. Upton" read the state constitution to require the specific analyses
of probable cause found in the older Aguilar-Spinelli line of cases from the
Warren Court days rather than the more generalized Illinois v. Gates74 proba-
ble cause test that the Burger Court announced.7" The majority of states
nominally adopted the Gates standard, but many of those states interpreted the
test in ways that still placed great weight on the specific Aguilar-Spinelli
inquiries.76 Even though these courts interpreted their own state constitutions,
they drew inspiration from Warren Court precedents. In the probable cause
cases, for instance, the Warren Court's broadest and most inspired language
about the need for uniformity in probable cause determinations figured in the
state court rulings."
The Warren Court's dicta influenced the state courts even more than did
its holdings. The Court outlined an attractive egalitarian vision of criminal
justice," and some state court judges accepted these ideals as their own. After
the Warren Court inspired them, the Burger Court empowered them. State
court activity in the arena of state constitutional law did not pick up momen-
Democratic Accountability: Is There a Crocodile in the Bathtub?, 64 WASH. L. REv. 19,46-47
(1989) (analyzing state judicial review).
73. 476 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 1985).
74. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230 (1983) (issuing "totality of the circumstances"
test).
75. Commonwealth v. Upton, 476 N.E.2d 548,556 (Mass. 1985); see also State v. Jones,
706 P.2d 317, 322 (Alaska 1985) (advocating Aguilar-Spinelli test over Gates test); People v.
Campa, 686 P.2d 634, 641 (Cal. 1984) (same); State v. Kimbro, 496 A.2d 498, 501 (Conn.
1985) (same), overruled by State v. Barton, 594 A.2d 917 (Conn. 1991); People v. Griminger,
524 N.E.2d 409,410 (N.Y. 1988) (same); State v. Jacumin, 778 S.W.2d 430,431 (Tenn. 1989)
(using Aguilar-Spinelli test); State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 139 (Wash. 1984) (same). But cf
Commonwealth v. Gray, 503 A.2d 921, 927 (Pa. 1985) (correlating Gates and Pennsylvania
constitution).
76. See Op. REV. STAT. § 133.545(4) (2001) (requiring that search warrant application
shall consist of proposed warrant plus one or more affidavits); State v. Reesman, 10 P.3d 83,
89 (Mont. 2000) (using Gates test moderated by Aguilar-Spinelli influences); State v.
Utterback, 485 N.W.2d 760, 766 (Neb. 1992) (using Gates test), overruled by State v. Johnson,
589 N.W.2d 108 (Neb. 1999).
77. See State v. Jackson, 688 P.2d 136, 139-42 (Wash. 1984) (drawing on reasoning of
Aguilar and Spinelli as basis for rejecting Gates).
78. See Jesse H. Choper, On the Warren Court and Judicial Review, 7 CATH. U. L. REv.
20, 34-36 (1967) (applauding rise in egalitarianism); Israel, supra note 29, at 24548 (noting
theme of fairness and equality for defendants in Warren Court decisions).
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turn because of Burger Court decisions reversing the balance of power be-
tween the prosecution and the defense. Instead, the momentum came from the
gap between ideals and reality. The Warren Court pointed to this gap and
implied that it would close. 9 The Burger Court accepted the ideals, some-
times grudgingly, but made it clear that the federal courts would not close this
gap in state criminal justice." In such a setting, the interpretive power of state
courts became more relevant and more widely understood than ever.
Scholars watching these developments debated whether the state courts
were using their power often enough. Many complained that the state courts
turned down many more invitations than they accepted. It was most common
to find state courts affirming the limited holdings of the Burger Court rather
than expanding the reach of state constitutions." Some argued that it was not
legitimate or even possible for state courts to sustain their own readings of
common constitutional provisions.8 2 But most argued in favor of an independ-
ent voice for state courts and wondered why the state courts did not reject
United States Supreme Court positions more often."3
79. See supra notes 49-55 and accompanying text (discussing high ideals embodied in
Warren Court decisions).
80. See supra notes 62-70 and accompanying text (discussing Burger Court's change of
trajectory from Warren Court).
81. BARRY LATZER, STATE CONSTrrUTiONs AND CRIMINAL JUSTIcE 158 (1991); see
Ronald K.L. Collins & Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review: 1985
Survey of State Constitutional Individual Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. REv. 317, 320-21
(1986) (noting that state court opinions sometimes have adopted Burger Court decisions and
sometimes have expanded rights through state constitutions); Craig F. Emmert & Carol Ann
Traut, State Supreme Courts, State Constitutions, and Judicial Policymaking, 16 JUST. SYS. J.
37, 41-45 (1992) (analyzing state courts' behavior in judicial review cases); Paul W. Kahn,
State Constitutionalism and the Problem of Fairness, 30 VAL. U. L. REV. 459, 465 (1996)
(discussing how most state courts do not expand rights under state constitutions); Barry Latzer,
The Hidden Conservatism of the State Court "Revolution," 74 JUDICATURE 190, 193-95 (1991)
(arguing that state courts are more likely to accept than reject decisions of Burger and Rehnquist
Courts); Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N.M. L. REV.
271, 288-91 (1998) (explaining judicial review by state courts); 0. Alan Taff, The New Judicial
Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1097, 1114-17 (1997) (noting tendency
of state courts to rely on federal doctrines rather than state constitutions).
82. See James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse ofState Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L.
REv. 761, 780-84 (1992) (citing statistics showing infrequency of state courts to cite state
constitutions); Earl M. Maltz, False Prophet - Justice Brennan and the Theory of State
Constitutional Law, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429, 434-43 (1988) (arguing that examination
of federalism is not appropriate in state constitutional analysis).
83. See, e.g., A.E. Dick Howard, State Courts and ConstitutionalRights in the Day of the
Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873, 883 (1976) (noting restraint by some state courts); Robert
A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State ConstitutionalLaw, 84 VA. L. REv. 389,393-
94 (1998) (arguing for legitimacy of independent state interpretation even if state population
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This impatience misses the point. Independent interpretation has an effect
even without overwhelming numbers. On a huge range of criminal justice
questions, at least some state courts disagree about the requirements properly
imposed on law enforcement.8 4 On a few issues, a strong minority or even a
slight majority of state courts have chosen a direction different from the United
States Supreme Court."5 But the outcomes are less important than the constant
presence of the arguments. It is now commonplace for litigants to remind a
state appellate court that it has interpretive options.86 Many constitutional
doctrines are plausible and available to state courts; many applications of a
single constitutional rule are possible.
The mindset that these cases embody is a profound and powerful change.
The habits of independence now at work in state courts in the criminal justice
arena mean more than what a few state constitutional rulings can reveal.
Although the state courts might decline to pursue their own constitutional path
does not share distinctive beliefs); Robert F. Williams, In the Supreme Court's Shadow:
Legitimacy of State Rejection of Supreme Court Reasoning and Result, 35 S.C. L. REv. 353,
360-62 (1984) (analyzing use and effect of state court decisions rejecting Supreme Court
reasoning based on state constitutions).
84. See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 896 P.2d 889, 903 (Haw. 1995) (holding that third-party
consent must arise from actual rather than apparent authority); State v. Meyer, 893 P.2d 159,
165 (Haw. 1995) (noting that discovery must be inadvertent to justify seizure of item seen in
plain view); Sitz v. Dept. of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209, 219 (Mich. 1993) (holding that
individualized suspicion is necessary for sobriety checkpoint); State v. Tucker, 642 A.2d 401,
408 (N.J. 1994) (suggesting that police must show individualized suspicion to justify armed
chase of person on foot); State v. Johnson, 346 A.2d 66, 68 (N.J. 1975) (stating that consent
validates search only if party consenting to search knows about right to refuse consent); People
v. Diaz, 612 N.E.2d 298, 302 (N.Y. 1993) (rejecting "plain feel" exception to limits on Terry
frisk); People v. Torres, 543 N.E.2d 61, 63 (N.Y. 1989) (refusing to permit automatic search
of car interior for weapons upon suspicion that driver is armed); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 636
A.2d 619, 624 (Pa. 1994) (stating that match with criminal profile does not substitute for
individual facts constituting reasonable suspicion).
85. See Roberts v. State, 881 P.2d 1, 6-7 (Nev. 1994) (citing strong minority of state
courts that have interpreted state law to impose two different materiality standards when
prosecutor fails to disclose exculpatory information and noting that standard depends on
whether defense requested information).
86. Treatises such as LATZER, supra note 81, reflect the routine nature of these arguments
that appeal to state constitutions. The routine quality of these arguments also becomes clear
when one compares decisions from the 1980s or early 1990s - decisions in which state courts
discussed their independent power to interpret their state constitutions - with more recent
decisions that treat this authority as a given. See Commonwealth v. Labron, 690 A.2d 228, 228-
29 (Pa. 1997) (upholding, on remand from United States Supreme Court, prior suppression
ruling on independent state constitutional grounds); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 586 A.2d 887,
894-95 (Pa. 1991) ("[W]e have stated with increasing frequency that it is both important and
necessary that we undertake an independent analysis of the Pennsylvania Constitution.").
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in a given case (or even in most cases), the option is always open, and the
courts debate it often.
B. Habits Spread to Federal Law
These habits of independence spread back from state constitutional law
into federal law. When state courts interpret the federal constitution, they
have more tools and more inclination to reach their own independent interpre-
tations. The state courts recognize, of course, that their decisions on federal
law are subject to review in the United States Supreme Court. Thus, they
must account for the Court's precedent on a given subject. But given the
Supreme Court's limited capacity for review"1 and the current restrictions on
federal habeas corpus,"8 state courts have now become the frequent interpret-
ers of federal law. With very limited exceptions, state courts have the final
word on the meaning of federal law in their own jurisdictions.
When measured by results, the state courts look like the lower federal
courts when they interpret federal law. The two sets of courts grant relief on
federal constitutional claims at roughly the same rates. 9 But the state courts
are not merely carrying out mandates from the United States Supreme Court.
As they exercise their interpretive authority over the federal constitution, state
courts occupy a variety of positions. Indeed, on some issues they seem to
produce a greater variety in federal constitutional doctrine than the lower
federal courts produce.'c They are adapting the ideals of Warren Court
decisions to the realities of their own systems. The state courts are also
addressing constitutional questions that may never arise in the federal
system.
91
87. See Chief Justice William Rehnquist, 2001 YEAR-END REPORT ON THE FEDERAL
JUDICIARY (Jan. 1, 2001) (giving statistics on Supreme Court's 2001 caseload), available at
http://www.suprcmecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2001year-endreport.html. The Rehnquist
Court has reduced its typical output to less than one hundred cases per year, with fewer than a
dozen criminal justice cases in the mix. Id.
88. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text (discussing limitations on habeas
corpus that Burger Court put in place).
89. Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal and
State Courts: An EmpiricalAnaysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 251
(1983); see Craig M. Bradley, Are State Courts Enforcing the Fourth Amendment? A Prelimi-
nary Study, 77 GEO. L.J. 251,264 (1988) (discussing statistics on states' enforcement of Fourth
Amendment).
90. See, e.g., State v. Maristany, 627 A.2d 1066, 1069 (N.J. 1993) (approving of third-
party consent based on apparent authority despite significant clues that person did not have
authority over property).
91. For example, some state laws on pretrial detention cover a broader range of crimes
than the federal pretrial detention statute, and therefore present unique due process issues. See
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C. State Legislatures
The state appellate courts are not the only state institutions to become
more engaged in criminal justice since the days of the Warren Court. State
legislatures have also filled the territory that the Supreme Court refused to
occupy. Some trends in 'the legislature have occurred outside the field of
criminal procedure in the field of substantive criminal law and in laws setting
(and funding) punishments. As Darryl Brown and Bill Stuntz point out, the
expanded reach of the substantive criminal law and the increased severity of
punishment have countered many of the libertarian effects of Warren Court
procedural rulings.' Although these statutes do not speak directly to proce-
dure, they have powerful effects on the work of police, prosecutors, and
sentencing judges.
But other state statutes speak more directly to the procedural questions
that the Warren Court opened for debate. For instance, when it comes to
providing counsel for indigent defendants, some states fund attorneys for
broader groups of defendants and some fund counsel for narrower groups."
Legislatures have created systems for delivering counsel that produce strik-
ingly different qualities of representation that range from flat fee contracts to
statewide public defender services.'
State legislatures appear to be more active in criminal justice matters
today than they were in 1969.9s They have not involved themselves more
deeply in criminal justice merely in reaction to the United States Supreme
Court; other trends have reinforced active legislatures. For several genera-
N.M. CONST. art. II, § 13 (setting out circumstances under which court may allow bail).
92. See Darryl K. Brown, The Warren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retribu-
tive Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1411, 1413 (2002) (discussing use of substantive
criminal law to undercut criminal procedure protections); see also William J. Stuntz, The
Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 519-20 (2001) (discussing
shifting of lawmaking and adjudication from courts to prosecutors that results from criminal
law's expansion).
93. Compare FLA. R. CraM. P. 3.111 (requiring counsel for indigent defendants in felony
cases and misdemeanor cases in which defendant potentially faces imprisonment) with VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, §§ 5201, 5231 (1998) (requiring counsel for needy persons in any case in
which fine of more than $1000 or imprisonment is possible).
94. See N.C. INDIoENT DEF. STUDY COMM'N, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 4-10
(2000) (on file with author) (describing mixed system of public defenders and appointed
counsel and arguing that central coordination of system will improve cost effectiveness and
create standards to improve quality of representation).
95. One brief measure of legislative activity might involve the sheer number of statutes
enacted. In its 2001 session, the North Carolina General Assembly passed at least twenty-eight
new criminal justice enactments. See 2001 N.C. ADV. LEoIS. SERe. PAMPHETS 1-8 (listing
2001 legislative enactments).
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tions, rules have proliferated in criminal justice. Many institutions have
shifted power away from field-level officials such as police officers on the
beat or sentencing judges at the trial level." These rules come from state
legislatures, state and federal appellate courts, sentencing commissions, and
police department management. The Warren Court's ideals and endorsement
of change, together with the Burger Court's shortened reach, made it easier for
them.
IV The Rehnquist Court Ices State Variety
Into this institutional cacophony, enter the Rehnquist Court. In many
contexts, the Justices have spoken warmly about the genius of federalism and
the "laboratories" in the states.' Some of the Court's holdings have shifted
power from the federal government to the state governments," but in the
realm of criminal justice, the Court has done little to encourage independent
state institutions. Instead, the Rehnquist Court's decisions sometimes have
the effect of ice. They chill growth and movement in the states.
I claim no insight into the intent of the Justices; I speak only about the
effects of their decisions. Furthermore, I do not claim that all the criminal
justice opinions of the Rehnquist Court have the effect of ice. Some do not.
The fact that some Supreme Court decisions operate like ice in the state courts
while others do not presents the puzzle that will occupy the remainder of this
Article. Do any features of the issues allow us to predict when the state courts
will follow the lead of the Supreme Court rather than moving in a different
direction?
The first icy decision that we consider is Whren v. United States." In
that case, police officers suspected that the driver and a passenger in a car
possessed drugs; a traffic violation gav6 the officers a pretext to check out
96. See generally SAMUELWALKER, TAMINoTHE SYSTEM: THE CONTROL OFDISCRETION
IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE, 1950-1990, at 145-56 (1993) (discussing movement to control discretion
in criminal justice); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 94 HARV. L.
REV. 1521, 1521-22 (1981) (recognizing shift away from discretionary power in criminal justice
system).
97. See, e.g., Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305,324 (1997) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(quoting Justice Brandeis on virtues of states serving as laboratories for social experiments);
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 8 (1995) (same).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607-19 (2000) (striking down
federal criminal statute as exceeding congressional authority under Commerce Clause and
Fourteenth Amendment); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 730-60 (1999) (declaring that
Congress generally cannot create private rights of action against state governments); United
States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (striking down federal criminal statute as
exceeding congressional authority under Commerce Clause).
99. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
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their hunch, and the subsequent search uncovered drugs.' The defendants
asked the court to exclude the evidence because the officers had no reasonable
suspicion of drug activity and would not have stopped their vehicle in the
absence of their hunch about drugs.' The defendants claimed that the Fourth
Amendment barred such pretextual stops. 2
Michael Whren was not the first criminal defendant to make this argu-
ment. Most of the earlier cases involved the use of traffic stops for drug
enforcement purposes, but a few arose in other settings. 3 Before the Su-
preme Court ever spoke to the issue, the state courts and the lower federal
courts came down on both sides of the pretextual stop question. The state
cases were about equally divided; ° the federal cases ran about two-to-one in
100. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808-09 (1996).
101. Id. at 809.
102. Id. at 810.
103. See State v, Blair, 691 S.W.2d 259, 262-64 (Mo. 1985) (en bane) (barring use of
evidence when police in murder investigation gathered such evidence from pretextual arrest
based on outstanding warrant for traffic offense), overruled by State v. Mease, 842 S.W.2d 98
(Mo. 1992) (en bane); Home v. Commonwealth, 339 S.E.2d 186, 190 (Va. 1986) ("[I]f the
arrest is bona fide, the police can make preplanned coordinated use of the arrest to give them
the opportunity to ask questions about matters for which probable cause to arrest does not
exist.").
104. At least eleven states recognized some potential constitutional limits on pretextual
stops. See Brown v. State, 580 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Alaska 1978) (stating that arrest or traffic stop
"should not be used as a pretext for a search"); Mings v. State, 884 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Ark.
1994) (allowing pretextual stop for minor infraction if reasonable officer would have made stop
in absence of improper motive); Kehoe v. State, 521 So. 2d 1094, 1096-97 (Fla. 1988) (same),
abrogation recognized by State v. Corvin, 677 So. 2d 947 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996); Tate v.
State, 440 S.E.2d 646, 650 (Ga. 1994) (same); People v. Guerrieri, 551 N.E.2d 767, 770 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1990) (same), abrogation recognized by People v. Thompson, 670 N.E.2d 1129 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1996); State v. Izzo, 623 A.2d 1277, 1280 (Me. 1993) (same); State v. Van Ackeren,
495 N.W.2d 630, 644 (Neb. 1993) ("An arrest may not be used as a pretext to search for
evidence."); Alejandre v. State, 903 P.2d 794, 796-97 (Nev. 1995) (allowing pretextual stop for
minor infraction if reasonable officer would have made stop in absence of improper motive),
overruled by Gaina v. State, 920 P.2d 1010 (Nev. 1996); People v. Owens, 623 N.Y.S.2d 719,
721 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) ("[Plolice officers may not use a traffic infraction as a 'mere pretext'
to investigate the defendant on an unrelated matter."); Limonja v. Commonwealth, 383 S.E.2d
476, 480 (Va. Ct. App. 1989) (allowing pretextual stop for minor infraction if reasonable officer
would have made stop in absence of improper motive); State v. Chapin, 879 P.2d 300, 304-05
(Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (same).
At least nine states before Whren refused to overturn a stop or arrest based on an alleged
pretext, as long as the officer had some justification for the stop or arrest. See Ex parte
Scarbrough, 621 So. 2d 1006, 1010 (Ala. 1993) (using pure objective test, allowing no room
for examination of officer's subjective intent); State v. Swanson, 838 P.2d 1340, 1343-44 (Ariz.
1992) (same); People v. King, 36 Cal. Rptr. 2d 365, 369 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (same); State v.
Bolosan, 890 P.2d 673, 681 (Haw. 1995) (holding "that an investigative stop can be justified
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favor of the Government's position."°5 Some courts in the state cases based
their decisions explicitly on the federal constitution, while others were ambig-
uous about their source."°
The Whren majority ruled that the Fourth Amendment does not prevent
pretextual stops."° Among the many unfortunate features ofthis decision, one
of the most important was the decision's influence on state courts as they
interpreted their own state constitutions. While some state courts before
Whren had accepted the claim in limited settings," they now fell in line
behind the Supreme Court. In rapid succession, state courts ruled that their
respective state constitutions, like the federal constitution, did not bar
pretextual stops.1" Moreover, the state decisions took on the categorical
based on an objectively reasonable suspicion of any offense, provided that the offense for which
reasonable suspicion exists is related to the offense articulated by the officer involved"); State
v. Law, 769 P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Idaho Ct. App. 1989) (using pure objective test, allowing no
room for examination of officer's subjective intent); People v. Haney, 480 N.W.2d 322, 324
(Mich. Ct. App. 1992) (same); State v. Carter, 600 P.2d 873, 875 (Or. 1979) (en bane) (same);
Garcia v. State, 827 S.W.2d 937, 944 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (same); State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d
1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (adopting pure objective test as to stop, but limiting pursuant investiga-
tion and detention to "reasonable scope").
105. For federal appellate cases rejecting the defendant's pretext arguments, see United
States v. Scopo, 19 F.3d 777, 784 (2d Cir. 1994); United States v. Ferguson, 8 F.3d 385, 391
(6th Cir. 1993) (en bane); United States v. Hassan El, 5 F.3d 726, 730 (4th Cir. 1993); United
State v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500-01 (8th Cir. 1990); United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037,
1041 (7th Cir. 1989); United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (5th Cir. 1987) (en
bane), which all adopted a pure objective test but allowed room for examination of an officer's
subjective intent. For the smaller group of federal cases accepting the defendant's argument,
see United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988), overruled by United States
v. Botera-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783 (10th Cir. 1995) (en bane); United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d
472,476 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704,708 (11th Cir. 1986), which all
adopted a test allowing pretextual stops for minor infractions if a reasonable officer would have
made the stop in the absence of an improper motive.
106. See, e.g., Mings v. State, 884 S.W.2d 596, 602 (Ark. 1994) (relying on federal
constitution); State v. Izzo, 623 A.2d 1277, 1280-81 (Me. 1993) (same); Alejandre v. State, 903
P.2d 794, 796-97 (Nev. 1995) (interpreting federal constitution); People v. Owens, 623
N.Y.S.2d 719,724 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1995) (relying on both state law and federal constitution).
107. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 819 (1996) ("[W]e think that there is no
realistic alternative to the traditional common-law rule that probable cause justifies a search and
seizure.").
108. See supra note 104 (listing states that accepted such claims).
109. See Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757, 759 (Fla. 1997) (construing limits under state
constitution as coterminous with Fourth Amendment protections in pretextual stop context);
Mitchell v. State, 745 N.E.2d 775, 787 (Ind. 2001) (interpreting state constitution to allow
pretextual stops based on minor infractions); Commonwealth v. Murdough, 704 N.E.2d 1184,
1186 (Mass. 1999) (construing limits under state constitution as coterminous with Fourth
Amendment protections in pretextual stop context); State v. Farabee, 22 P.3d 175, 181 (Mont.
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quality of Justice Scalia's opinion in Whren. According to these state courts,
their state constitutions left no room to consider the subjective intent of an
officer. What was once a roughly equal split among the state cases has
become a rout. Today, only one state - Washington - clearly interprets its
state constitution to place limits on pretextual stops. 1°
These courts replaced their tentative early approaches with the Supreme
Court's confident pronouncements. They now declare unworkable any rule
that considered the intent or typical behavior of police officers. Remarkably,
some states in which fact-finders were already applying the "would have" test
now declared that it was impossible for a fact-finder to determine what an
officer "would have" done in the absence of an underlying motive to investi-
gate a hunch. They replaced a minimalist approach that decided pretext
claims based on context (traffic stops and otherwise) with a search for abstract
principles in United States Supreme Court opinions."' The effect of the
Whren decision was to freeze the flowering of a nuanced case law in the state
courts. It shifted their attention from the reality in the field to the consistency
of legal precedent.
2000) (interpreting state constitution to allow pretextual stops based on minor infractions); State
v. Bartholomew, 602 N.W.2d 510, 514 (Neb. 1999) (same); Gama v. State, 920 P.2d 1010,
1012-13 (Nev. 1996) (construing limits under state constitution as coterminous with Fourth
Amendment protections in pretextual stop context); State v. McBreairty, 697 A.2d 495,496-97
(N.H. 1997) (construing limits under state constitution as coterminous with Fourth Amendment
protections in pretextual stop context); People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638, 642 (N.Y. 2001)
(interpreting state constitution to allow pretextual stops based on minor infractions); State v.
McClendon, 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (N.C. 1999) (same); State v. Bjerke, 697 A.2d 1069, 1073
(R.I. 1997) (refusing to extend protections of state constitution further than those of Fourth
Amendment); cf Caldwell v. State, 780 A.2d 1037, 1046 n.18 (Del. 2001) (declining to decide
limits on initial traffic stop under state constitution); People v. Rucker, 689 N.E.2d 1203, 1207-
08 (II1. App. Ct. 1998) (following Whren without reference to state constitution); State v.
Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 205-06 (Iowa 1996) (same); State v. Hardyway, 958 P.2d 618, 622
(Kan. 1998) (same); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 37 S.W.3d 745, 749 (Ky. 2001) (same); State
v. Waters, 780 So. 2d 1053, 1056-57 (La. 2001) (same); State v. Bolduc, 722 A.2d 44,45 (Me.
1998) (same); Wilkes v. State, 774 A.2d 420,430-31 (Md. 2001) (same); State v. Battleson, 567
N.W.2d 69, 71 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997) (same); Guerrero v. State, 746 So. 2d 940, 943 (Miss.
Ct. App. 1999) (same); State v. Dickey, 706 A.2d 180, 186 (N.J. 1998) (same); City of Fargo
v. Sivertson, 571 NW.2d 137, 141 (N.D. 1997) (same); State ex rel. Dep't of Pub. Safety v.
1985 Chevrolet Blazer, 994 P.2d 1183, 1186 (Okla. Civ. App. 1999) (same); State v. Nelson,
519 S.E.2d 786, 790 (S.C. 1999) (same); State v. Trudeau, 683 A.2d 725, 728 n.3 (Vt. 1996)
(same).
110. See State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 842-43 (Wash. 1999) (en banc) (rejecting Whren
rationale and stating that state constitution requires investigation into totality of circumstances,
including subjective intent of officer and objective reasonableness of officer's actions).
111. Cf CASSR. SUNSTEN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIALMINIMALsMoNTHE SUPREME
COURT 3-23 (1999) (discussing "decisional minimalism").
HOW THE SUPREME COURT DELIVERS FIRE AND ICE
But the story of Whren does not stop in the state courts. While Whren
convinced state courts to abandon their efforts to regulate pretextual stops, it
had no such effect on state legislatures. Legislators debated traffic stops
based on the race of a driver - the crime of "driving while black." They
passed laws that required police departments to keep more data about traffic
stops; many other departments issued their own policies on data collection."1
This public debate has created a political consensus that pretextual stops
motivated by suspicions based on a driver's race are illegitimate. People
disagree about how often these traffic stops occur, but these stops have
become hard to defend in principle. Thus, when the Supreme Court delivers
ice to the state courts, it will not necessarily cool the debate in the state
legislatures.
A second example of Rehnquist Court ice comes from the Miranda
context. In Davis v. United States,"' the Court addressed the question of how
officers must react during interrogation when the suspect makes an ambiguous
statement that may (or may not) indicate a desire to speak to counsel or to
remain silent."14 Other courts had developed three possible responses, and two
of the three attracted serious support in state courts and in lower federal
courts.
First, the interrogators might stop the questioning entirely if the suspect
makes an ambiguous statement that could indicate an invocation of rights.
This option had slender support."1 5 The second possibility was clearly the
most popular: officers faced with such an ambiguous statement must stop
their questions about the crime until they ask "clarifying questions" to deter-
mine whether the suspect truly was invoking Miranda rights. At least seven
of the federal circuits followed this position, along with at least twenty
states." 6 A third option found support in fewer than half a dozen jurisdic-
112. See David A. Harris, Addressing Racial Profiling in the States: A Case Study of the
"New Federalism" in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 367, 386-90
(2001) (listing state legislatures that introduced or passed bills and police departments that
adopted policies).
113. 512 U.S. 452 (1994).
114. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 454 (1994) (stating issue).
115. See Maglio v. Jago, 580 F.2d 202, 205 (6th Cir. 1978) (interpreting ambiguous
statement as invocation of right to counsel and requiring questioning to stop); People v.
Superior Court, 542 P.2d 1390, 1394-95 (Cal. 1975) (en banc) (same), superseded by CAL.
CONST. art. I, § 28; State v. Furlough, 797 S.W.2d 631, 639 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990) (same).
116. See United States v. March, 999 F.2d 456, 461-62 (10th Cir. 1993) (en banc)
(requiring clarifying questions after accused makes ambiguous statement regarding desire for
attorney in order for interrogation to continue); United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d
1467, 1472 (11th Cir. 1992) (same), abrogation recognized by Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d
1420 (1 1th Cir. 1994); United States v. D'Antoni, 856 F.2d 975, 980-81 (7th Cir. 1988) (same);
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tions: officers in this situation could proceed with questions about the crime,
and the questions stopped only when the suspect "unambiguously" invoked a
Miranda right." 7
In the end, the Supreme Court chose the third option,"' even though the
Government argued only in favor of the intermediate "clarifying questions"
approach." 9 And within a short time, the holding in Davis transformed the
landscape in state courts. The "continued questioning" approach under the
federal constitution became the most common approach followed by state
courts. 2 Like Whren, Davis effectively wiped out variety in the state courts.
United States v. Gotay, 844 F.2d 971, 975 (2d Cit. 1988) (same), abrogation recognized by
Diaz v. Senkowski, 76 F.3d 61 (2d Cir. 1996); United States v. Fouche, 776 F.2d 1398, 1405
(9th Cit. 1985) (same), overruling on other grounds recognized by Brooks v. Cook, No. 92-
56232, 1994 WL 232272 (9th Cir. May 31, 1994); United States v. Porter, 776 F.2d 370, 370
(1st Cir. 1985) (same); Nash v. Estelle, 597 F.2d 513, 517 (5th Cir. 1979) (en bane) (same),
abrogation recognized by Soffar v. Cockrell, 300 F.3d 588 (5th Cit. 2002); Hampel v. State,
706 P.2d 1173, 1180 (Alaska Ct. App. 1985) (same); State v. Staatz, 768 P.2d 143, 146 (Ariz.
1988) (en banc) (same); People v. Benjamin, 732 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Colo. 1987) (same); State
v. Anderson, 553 A.2d 589, 592-93 (Conn. 1989) (same); Crawford v. State, 580 A.2d 571,
576-77 (Del. 1990) (same); Ruffin v. United States, 524 A.2d 685,700-02 (D.C. 1987) (same);
Martinez v. State, 564 So. 2d 1071, 1073-74 (Fla. 1990) (same); Hall v. State, 336 S.E.2d 812,
816-18 (Ga. 1985) (same), implied overruling recognized by Tucker v. State, 491 S.E.2d 420
(Ga. Ct. App. 1997); Carter v. State, 702 P.2d 826, 832 (Idaho 1985) (same); Sleek v. State, 499
N.E.2d 751, 754-55 (Ind. 1986) (same); People v. Giuchici, 324 N.W.2d 593, 595 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982) (per curiam) (same); State v. Pilcher, 472 N.W.2d 327, 332 (Minn. 1991) (same);
Kuykendall v. State, 585 So. 2d 773, 777 (Miss. 1991) (same); Sechrest v. State, 705 P.2d 626,
630 (Nev. 1985) (same), overruled by Harte v. State, 13 P.3d 420 (Nev. 2000); State v. Gerald,
549 A.2d 792, 831-32 (N.J. 1988) (same), superseded on other grounds by N.J. CONST. Art. I,
12; Russell v. State, 727 S.W.2d 573, 575-77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (en bane) (same),
abrogated by Sate v. Panetti, 891 S.W.2d 281 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994); State v. Sampson, 808 P.2d
1100, 1108-10 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (same), abrogation on other grounds recognized by State
v. Hilfiker, 868 P.2d 826 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); State v. Robtoy, 653 P.2d 284, 290 (Wash.
1982) (same); State v. Clawson, 270 S.E.2d 659,670 (W. Va. 1980) (same), implied overruling
on other grounds recognized by State v. Leep, 569 S.E.2d 133 (W. Va. 2002); Cheatham v.
State, 719 P.2d 612, 618-19 (Wyo. 1986) (same).
117. See Dean v. Commonwealth, 844 S.W.2d 417, 420 (Ky. 1992) (requiring clear
statement in order to invoke right to counsel); People v. Krueger, 412 N.E.2d 537, 540 (Ill.
1980) (interpreting ambiguous statement as insufficient to invoke right to counsel); Eaton v.
Commonwealth, 397 S.E.2d 385, 394 (Va. 1990) (requiring clear statement in order to invoke
right to counsel).
118. See Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (requiring unambiguous statement to invoke right to
counsel and stop interrogation).
119. Brieffor the United States at 29-30, Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (1994) (No.
92-1949).
120. See, e.g., State v. Eastlack, 883 P.2d 999, 1007 (Ariz. 1994) (en bane) (applying
Davis rule); State v. Owen, 696 So. 2d 715, 718-19 (Fla. 1997) (adopting Davis approach under
state constitution); People v. Cohen, 640 N.Y.S.2d 921, 933 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996) (applying
HOW THE SUPREME COURT DELIVERS FIRE AND ICE
Although the state courts still had the authority to read their own constitutions
to create or apply any number of rules in this setting, the "continuing question-
ing" approach dominated the others.
The Relmquist Court's criminal justice cases contain more than ice.
Sometimes the Court resolves doubts about the legality of law enforcement
practice, but the state courts remain scattered on whether to allow it. They do
not unite behind the Supreme Court.
Take, for instance, Moran v. Burbine,' another case with close kinship
to Miranda. In that case, the police took Brian Burbine into custody for a
burglary but also suspected his involvement in a recent murder.122 Burbine
had a pre-existing relationship with a lawyer from the public defender's
office, and his sister notified the office about Burbine's arrest.12 An attorney
from that office called the police station to declare that she represented
Burbine, but the police officer told the attorney that no one would question
Burbine that night.'24 However, detectives began an interrogation an hour
later. 2' Detectives issued the standard Miranda warnings but never informed
Burbine that his attorney had called and was available for consultation.126
Burbine later admitted to the murder.127 The Supreme Court ruled that this
interrogation did not violate the privilege against self-incrimination 2' or the
right to counsel.
29
Davis rule), order rev'd in part by 687 N.E.2d 1313 (N.Y. 1997); Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d
244,257 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (same); Midkiffv. Commonwealth, 462 S.E.2d 112, 115 (Va.
1995) (same); State v. Ross, 552 N.W.2d 428, 431-33 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) (adopting Davis
as part of Wisconsin jurisprudence).
Only a few states have rejected Davis as a matter of state constitutional law and continue
to require clarifying questions instead. What was once the dominant position now commands
less of a following. See State v. Hoey, 881 P.2d 504, 524 (Haw. 1994) (requiring clarifying
questions under state constitution); State v. Chew, 695 A.2d 1301, 1318 (N.J. 1997) (continuing
to require clarifying questions in spite of Davis); cf. State v. Farley, 452 S.E.2d 50, 59 n.12 (W.
Va. 1994) (distinguishing Davis in case dealing with right to silence).
121. 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
122. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,416 (1986).
123. Id.
124. Id. at 417.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 417-18.
127. Id. at418.
128. See id. at 422 ("Events occurring outside the presence of the suspect and entirely
unknown to him surely can have no bearing on the capacity to comprehend and knowingly
relinquish a constitutional right.").
129. See id. at 429 (stating that right to counsel under Sixth Amendment does not attach
prior to initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings).
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This decision did not impress the state courts. 30 Although some state
courts endorsed the Burbine holding for purposes of their own state constitu-
tion, 3' the larger group rejected the decision.' The state opinions sounded
scandalized - even a bit self-righteous - that the Supreme Court would tolerate
such intentional maneuvering to prevent an attorney from contacting a client.'33
Why the difference between Whren and Davis on the one hand and Burbine on
the other? Is it possible to predict which Supreme Court rulings will attract a
following among state courts while others remain uninfluential?
Certainly some characteristics of the courts of a particular state might
indicate whether they will pursue an independent reading of the law. Are the
judges in the state appointed or elected? Have the state courts reached inde-
pendent rulings on constitutional criminal procedure in the past? Has commen-
tary by academics, journalists, or influential judges called attention to a tradi-
tion of independence in the state? Knowledge on any of these issues might
130. The unenthusiastic response to Burbine in some state courts is particularly interesting
because the Attorneys General of thirty states filed amicus curiae briefs in the case arguing for
an affirmance of the conviction. See Brief Amici Curiae Submitted by the States of California,
at al. at 25, Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412 (1986) (No. 84-1485) ("We ask that the First
Circuit's... decision protecting foolish suspects from themselves, be rejected.").
131. See Ajabu v. State, 693 N.E.2d 921, 931 (Ind. 1998) (reaching same conclusion under
both Burbine and Indiana Constitution); Lodowski v. State, 513 A.2d 299, 306-08 (Md. 1986)
(adopting Burbine approach as in accordance with state constitution); State v. Stephenson, 878
S.W.2d 530, 547 (Tenn. 1994) (same), overruling on other grounds recognized by State v.
Saylor, No. E-2001-00604-CCA-R3-CD, 2002 WL 1482721 (Tenn. Crim. App. July 11, 2002);
State v. Earls, 805 P.2d 211, 216-19 (Wash. 1991) (en bane) (same); State v. Hanson, 401
N.W.2d 771, 778 (Wis. 1987) (same); cf. Mitchell v. State, 816 S.W.2d 566, 568 (Ark. 1991)
(following Burbine with no mention of state constitution); State v. Drayton, 361 S.E.2d 329,
334-35 (S.C. 1987) (same).
132. See People v. Houston, 724 P.2d 1166, 1173-75 (Cal. 1986) (rejecting Burbine under
state constitution), superseded by CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28; State v. Stoddard, 537 A.2d 446,
451-52 (Conn. 1988) (same); Bryan v. State, 571 A.2d 170, 176-77 (Del. 1990) (same);
Haliburton v. State, 514 So. 2d 1088, 1090 (Fla. 1987) (same); People v. McCauley, 645
N.E.2d 923,930 (I1. 1994) (same); West v. Commonwealth, 887 S.W.2d 338, 342 (Ky. 1994)
(upholding pre-Burbine criminal rule providing access to counsel); Commonwealth v.
Mavredakis, 725 N.E.2d 169, 176-79 (Mass. 2000) (rejecting Burbine under state constitution);
People v. Bender, 551 N.W.2d 71, 78-80 (Mich. 1996) (same); State v. Reed, 627 A.2d 630,
645 (N.J. 1993) ("Prior to (Burbine], a majority of states followed a rule similar to the one we
enunciate today, without any apparent diminishment in the effectiveness of their law-enforce-
ment agencies."); State v. Isom, 761 P.2d 524, 527 (Or. 1988) (en bane) (reaffirming pre-
Burbine state law cases). For a decision on this issue before Burbine, see State v. Luck, 472
N.E.2d 1097 (Ohio 1984).
133. See State v. Reed, 627 A.2d 630, 647 (N.J. 1993) ("[P]olice and prosecutorial
behavior, in denying defendant access to counsel, did not well serve the investigative function.
Such conduct does not promote public esteem for the law, and it substantially increases the
possibility that a suspect's confession will be involuntary. At a minimum, such conduct must
not be encouraged by the courts.").
HOW THE SUPREME COURT DELIVERS FIRE AND ICE
help one foresee how the courts in a particular state would react to an opinion
from the Rehnquist Court.
However, a prediction could also turn on features of the legal issue at
stake, features that do not require specialized knowledge about a specific state
court. An issue-specific prediction would allow one to anticipate how the state
courts as a whole might respond to a case and yet not be able to guess what the
courts in any given state might do. Let us turn, then, to the types of issues that
might leave state courts more inclined to fall in line after a pronouncement
from the Supreme Court.
The cases that we have considered - Whren, Davis, and Burbine - all
share some features. In each case, the Supreme Court entered an area teeming
with different proposals and approaches. Some state courts had spoken to the
subject, however tentatively. The Supreme Court chose one of the less restric-
tive options and left state courts with a wide range of legitimate choices. What
was it about the issues in Whren and Davis that pushed the state courts as a
group to abandon their earlier experimentation and to endorse the Supreme
Court's approach?
One potential explanation - and alas, a cynical one - is volume. Not many
cases involve an attorney pursuing a client around the police station and the
client not knowing about the attorney's presence. On the other hand, plenty of
pretextual stops and ambiguous assertions of Miranda rights reach the courts.
Stronger procedural rights in the Burbine setting would not undercut many
investigations. State courts might assert their independence only when it is not
terribly costly, when the distinctive state requirements will only matter in a few
cases.
But my sunny disposition will not allow me to end on this cynical note, so
here are a few other possible explanations. Perhaps state courts refuse to
follow a Supreme Court ruling that favors law enforcement when the new case
contradicts local experience in the area. When local police or prosecutors have
encountered a problem regularly enough to generate a sizeable body of appel-
late decisions in the state courts, those courts might have confidence in their
own judgment about what is fair and workable. Perhaps this theory does not
explain Davis very well: state courts with significant experience nevertheless
followed the United States Supreme Court's change of direction. But it might
help explain the outcomes in other areas, such as the reluctance of some state
courts to follow the Supreme Court's new doctrine on informant information
as a basis for probable cause. 34
A third possible explanation relates to the second. Although appellate
courts might not have much experience with the particular issue involved, they
134. See supra notes 30-33, 73-77 and accompanying text (discussing line of cases from
Aguilar v. Texas through Illinois v. Gates and state court reaction to change in probable cause
standard).
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might by tradition or by law have extensive authority over an entire class of
issues. Examples might include regulation of the bar and discovery practices.
Thus, the fact that Burbine involved the interaction between the police and a
defense attorney - rather than a transaction between the police and the suspect
only - might have emboldened some state courts to step in and regulate the
practices. The same dynamic might explain state court reactions to certain
United States Supreme Court decisions that tolerated discovery misconduct by
police or prosecutors.135
Finally, state court reaction to the Supreme Court's criminal justice
decisions might amount to a critique of the Court's legal craftsmanship. When
the Supreme Court drastically changes the trajectory from its earlier work, state
courts could become more likely to ignore the new decision and to continue on
their own path. Perhaps this response comes from a sense of craftsmanship, a
feeling that the abruptness of the Supreme Court's decision is not very
lawyerly.
V Conclusion
The Warren Court's federalism legacy is ironically strong. Its holdings,
and even more so its rhetoric, put change and the control of police discretion
on the agenda for many players in criminal justice. The Warren Court did not
135. See supra note 85 (citing Roberts v. State, 881 P.2d I (Nev. 1994)). For instance, a
strong minority of state courts have refused to follow the Supreme Court's holding in Arizona
v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988), which held that a court can reverse a conviction based
on the prosecution's failure to preserve evidence potentially useful to the defense only if the
defendant shows that the Government acted in bad faith. See Exparte (ingo, 605 So. 2d 1237,
1241 (Ala. 1992) (disallowing prosecution's use of tests based on destroyed samples even
though no bad faith was present); Thorne v. Dep't of Pub. Safety, 774 P.2d 1326, 1330 n.9
(Alaska 1989) (construing state constitution as not requiring bad faith); State v. Morales, 657
A.2d 585, 591-92 (Conn. 1995) (adopting more flexible approach under state constitution);
Lolly v. State, 611 A.2d 956, 960 (Del. 1992) (refusing to supplant more flexible test in favor
of Youngblood test); State v. Matafeo, 787 P.2d 671, 673 (Haw. 1990) (acknowledging that
evidence in some cases may be so important that defense need not show bad faith); Common-
wealth v. Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277, 1291-93 (Mass. 1998) (applying balancing test that
does not necessarily require bad faith); Sheriff v. Warner, 926 P.2d 775, 778 (Nev. 1996)
(applying test in which bad faith is only one alternative that defendant may show to obtain
relief); State v. Smagula, 578 A.2d 1215, 1217-18 (N.H. 1990) (departing from strict reading
of Youngblood); State v. Riggs, 838 P.2d 975,977-79 (N.M. 1992) (applying balancing test that
does not necessarily require bad faith); Commonwealth v. Deans, 610 A.2d 32, 34-36 (Pa.
1992) (distinguishing Youngblood in case in which Government attempted to use same evidence
that defendant could not use because state lost it); State v. Cheeseboro, 552 S.E.2d 300, 307
(S.C. 2001) (treating bad faith as only one alternative that defendant may show to obtain relief);
State v. Ferguson, 2 S.W.3d 912, 917 (Tenn. 1999) (employing multifactor test that does not
necessarily require bad faith); State v. Delisle, 648 A.2d 632, 643 (Vt. 1994) (same); State v.
Osakalumi, 461 S.E.2d 504, 512 (W. Va. 1995) (same).
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set out to strengthen state courts and legislatures, but these state and local rule
makers gained the most when the Court placed limits on the discretionary
actors further down the line, such as police officers and trial judges.
State courts could always read their own constitutions differently than the
federal constitution. State judges and legislators could always interpret the
federal constitution for themselves. They could always reach issues that the
Supreme Court was unlikely to reach, or read federal provisions in subtly
different ways than federal judges might. But until the Warren Court planted
its ideas, state courts or legislatures did not even consider acting in this way.
In the short run, the Warren Court made itself the center of attention in
criminal justice. But as events have unfolded, state courts and other state
institutions have forced their way back to the center of the action. Those who
monitor change in criminal justice will overlook much of the action if they
attend only to the Supreme Court's opinions. Today, the reactions of state
actors to the Rehnquist Court matter at least as much as what the Court
actually says. This fervent self-determination at the state level is the unlikely
institutional legacy of the Warren Court in criminal justice.
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